The CMA consists of two key offences. First, unauthorised access to computer
programs or data, otherwise known as hacking. This offence is coupled with a
more serious version, which is if the hacking is carried out with intent to
commit or facilitate further offences. The second offence is unauthorised
modification of computer material.
The Police and Justice Act 2006 (PJA), though not yet in force, will
introduce long-awaited amendments to the CMA. The PJA replaces the offence of
unauthorised modification of computer material with an offence imposing criminal
liability on a person who: knowingly commits an unauthorised act in relation to
a computer; intends to perform such an act; or is reckless as to whether he or
she might be performing such an act.
The offence is committed where the effect of the unauthorised act is: to
impair the operation of any computer; to prevent or hinder access to any program
or data held in any computer; or to impair the operation of any such program or
the reliability of any such data.
The Police and Justice Act also brings in a new offence of obtaining,
supplying or offering to supply an article with the intention – or in the
belief that – it is likely to be used to commit or assist in the commission of
an offence. An article includes any program or data held in electronic form.
The intention is to criminalise the widespread distribution of hacking tools.
But developers of legitimate testing and system management tools need to be
wary of being caught by the wide ambit of the offence.
DOS attacks deliberately flood a web or email server with information until
it crashes. Confusion had arisen over whether DOS attacks were covered by the
unamended CMA in the case of David Lennon, who was originally cleared in 2005 of
crashing the email server of his former employer by inundating it with emails.
The ruling was later overturned – and to avoid further confusion, the PJA
more explicitly covers DOS attacks as “unauthorised acts with intent to impair
the operation of a computer”.
With all of the hype about identity theft, what are the legal
issues?
Identity theft is undoubtedly a growing problem and a hot media topic. We
have all seen advertisements that offer protection against identity fraud, and
assistance in putting everything back to normal after the event.
Apart from direct financial loss, the consequences of identity theft can be
far-reaching. Witness the case of Simon Bunce, whose plight was recently
reported
by the BBC.
Bunce had his credit card details stolen online and then became caught up in
Operation Ore and was wrongly accused of being a paedophile. Notwithstanding his
innocence, it took Bunce some time to prove that it was impossible for him to
have been the person using his card, during which time his reputation was
tarnished and he lost his highly-paid job.
Identity theft in itself is not unlawful; it is what the thief does with the
identity which leads to a crime being committed. This may seem an arbitrary
distinction, as identity theft often leads to identity fraud. However, while
e-crime is on the increase, as is people’s awareness of it, there is no
consensus as to how it should be defined and what should constitute a crime.
In the absence of clearly defined criminal offences, there is often a
misunderstanding as to whether a particular activity is unlawful and so whether
it should be reported to the authorities. In any event it is difficult to track
incidents of online crime.
In the past, companies have been reluctant to tell the police about e-crime
for fear of adverse publicity. This reluctance is exacerbated by the absence of
clear definitions of e-crime. If it is not clear if a crime has been committed,
then what incentive is there to file a report? As with any form of crime, good
intelligence is essential to prevention and detection.
Perhaps the most important question is: “who will pick up the costs of
identity theft?” So far the banks have protected their customers against losses.
This has been on the basis that the customers have a duty to take reasonable
care of their personal and financial details.
However, the revised Banking Code, which came into effect at the beginning of
April 2008 and is produced by the British Bankers’ Association, makes it clear
that banks will not be responsible for losses on online bank accounts if
consumers do not have up-to-date anti-virus, anti-spyware and firewall software
installed on their machines.
Maybe with the financial climate taking a turn for the worse, more emphasis
will be placed on the need to take personal responsibility for online security.
Only time will tell who ends up bearing the brunt of online crime.
Is putting a firewall in place sufficient with regards to security
obligations under the Data Protection Act (DPA)?
Recently there have been several high-profile incidents where various public
and private sector organisations have failed to take the appropriate steps to
comply with the seventh principle to the Act, which states that: “Appropriate
technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or
unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction
of, or damage to, personal data.”
In late 2007, the Information Commissioner’s Office came to the view that
retailer Marks & Spencer’s processing of personal data contravened the
seventh principle, when it allowed the details of 26,000 employees to be held on
a laptop without the protection of encryption.
The assistant Information Commissioner stated: “It is essential that before a
company allows personal information to leave its premises on a laptop there are
adequate security procedures in place to protect personal information, for
example, password protection and encryption.”
We await the outcome for HSBC, which, in April of this year, admitted losing
a computer disc with the details of 370,000 customers. Again, the information on
the disc was unencrypted.
In his guidance on the DPA, the Information Commissioner states there can be
no standard set of security measures that an organisation can implement to
ensure compliance. The Commissioner instead notes that what is “appropriate”
will depend on the circumstances, but of particular importance will be the
nature of the information and the harm that might result if a breach of security
were to occur.
The Commissioner sees this as a “risk- based approach to determining what
measures are appropriate”. The Act also states that what is appropriate will
depend on the state of the art in relation to available security measures and
the cost of implementing such measures.
Although it is not guaranteed, certified compliance with ISO/IEC 27001 is
generally taken to indicate an organisation’s compliance with the security
requirements of the Act. Certain types of personal data require particular
attention to security because the harm from disclosure would be greater than the
harm from the disclosure of normal information. The types of information that
require special attention to security are: human resources data; financial data;
and sensitive personal data.
IT leaders should note that it is not just technical measures that must be
considered – procedural measures also need to be implemented.
Personal data should not be left visible on an unattended computer screen.
Employees should activate a password-protected screen saver or close down the
relevant file.
More importantly, consideration should be given as to whether it is ever
justifiable to hold significant amounts of personal data on a laptop or other
portable storage device.
Why do I need boardroom buy-in to my information security
strategy?
There are a number of good reasons for making sure you get senior management
buy-in to your information security strategy. More importantly, there are a
number of good reasons why senior management should make it a priority to get
involved.
As far as the board is concerned, stakeholders want to ensure that
organisations are run in a competitive and risk-averse manner. Following recent
high-profile financial scandals, investors are keen to see that an organisation
has taken internal and external security measures.
Most business sectors are administered by a regulatory authority, a
professional body or by means of voluntary codes of conduct. Increasingly, there
is a focus by regulators and codes of conduct on the need to put in place
appropriate information security measures.
It has been acknowledged for some time that a top-down management approach to
risk is the correct strategy to adopt. To be fair, this is not a new concept and
flows from the Turnbull Report of 1999, which recommended that all directors
should analyse their current and foreseeable future risks and then prioritise so
the key risks are identified.
The report recommended appropriate procedures should then be implemented to
either eliminate or minimise the risk. It is for the board to ensure that such
procedures are enforced. The approach necessitates top-level management buy-in
to the whole process and is the approach adopted by virtually all information
security standards.
We have already seen the DPA impose obligations on organisations in relation
to security, and there are many other examples. But as far as directors are
concerned, part 16 of the Companies Act 2006 – which came into force on 6
April 2008 – provides enhanced rights to auditors to obtain information.
In particular, there is a requirement on all companies to provide accurate
information to their auditors, and failure to provide accurate information or to
delay in doing so can lead to a criminal offence being committed.
The 2006 Act requires that a statement goes into the company’s accounts to
reflect that each of the directors has disclosed all relevant information to its
auditors. The key to the disclosure requirement is that the information provided
must be accurate.
Any person who knowingly or recklessly makes a statement that is “misleading,
false or deceptive in a material particular”, commits an offence and runs the
risk of going to jail. Without appropriate information security in place, it is
difficult to ensure the integrity – and therefore the accuracy – of a
company’s data. The threat of jail usually pushes information security way up
the boardroom agenda.
Jon Fell is a partner and John Skelton is a senior associate at
international law firm
Pinsent Masons
Next week: part one of Computing’s definitive guide to outsourcing
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